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The EC hotspot approach in Greece: creating liminal EU territory 
Abstract 
This contribution makes a theoretical argument stemming from our study of the            
European Commission’s hotspot approach to the management of migrant populations. It           
draws on our empirical research findings and links these to emerging critical studies of              
the new EU border regime. Our field research took place on the island of Lesbos and in                 
the city of Athens over the course of twenty months (09.2015-04.2017) as part of              
Transcapes, a research grant funded under the ESRC/DFID Mediterranean Migration          
Research Programme (MMRP). No clear definition exists of what comprises a hotspot:            
instead, the EC describes this as an integrated “approach” for the enhancement of the              
capacity of member-states to deal with crises resulting from pressures at the Union’s             
external borders. Effective in its ambiguity, the “hotspot approach” therefore constitutes,           
as we argue, an integral part of the europeanisation and institutionalisation of border             
management: a powerfully ambiguous dispositif in the EU’s emerging border regime. 
We first unpack the notion of the hotspot from a historical perspective - both              
within the past and the emerging EU border and migration management regime. We             
then explore the ways in which the hotspot contributes toward the culmination of             
European integration, paving the way for the flexible governance of mobility and asylum.             
We situate the hotspot within the historical shift of migration and mobility control from the               
border to the territory as a whole, and we conclude by arguing that the hotspot plays the                 
role of a territorial incubator for the liminal EU territory: a paradigmatic space for a new                
form of governance that further disentangles territory from rights. 
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Introduction 
Despite the high-profile introduction of the European Commission's (EC) “hotspot          
approach” (2015) in response to the ongoing Mediterranean migration crisis , there is to             1
date no universally acknowledged definition of what actually constitutes such an           
“approach” - let alone what constitutes a “hotspot” in the first place. In introducing its               
“hotspot approach”, the EC speaks of alleviating ‘migratory pressure’ by facilitating the            
operation of key EU agencies on the ground. These include the European Asylum             
Support Office (EASO), the EU Border Agency (Frontex), the EU Police Cooperation            
Agency (Europol) and the EU Judicial Cooperation Agency (Eurojust). Yet the EC has             
failed to provide with a detailed description, raising questions about its underlying            
features (geographical and compositional) as well as the extend of its potential reach             
beyond the geographical confines of the border per se.  
Between September 2015 and March 2017, we undertook field research on the            
island of Lesbos and in the city of Athens as part of Transcapes, a research project                
funded under the ESRC/DFID Mediterranean Migration Research Programme (MMRP).         
We conducted more than eighty interviews and focus groups with key actors active on              
the island including local (municipal) and national authorities, representatives of          
international agencies (EC, EU member state representatives); international NGOs and          
key members of the local civil society. While in the field we quickly realised that the                
“hotspot” approach, hailed as the EC’s comprehensive crisis management tool,          
commanded further research: This new tool was to effectively act as a one-stop-shop for              
all relevant European agencies allowing them to operate and collaborate without           
hindrance inside large swaths of member-state territory adjacent to the EU’s external            
border. In this paper we move beyond our immediate empirical research to offer a              
theoretical insight into the potential significance of the hotspot over and above this             
particular Mediterranean migration crisis.  
To this aim, we first unpack the evolution of the hotspot so far. We position it                
within the past and emerging EU border and migration management regime, we explore             
how it feeds into other mechanisms, processes and institutions, and the Emergency            
Relocation Mechanism in particular. We then show how, far from an ad hoc invention,              
the hotspot mechanism constitutes a milestone in the culmination of the European            
integration project, what we term European integration 2.0. A crucial step toward a             
long-standing attempt to europeanise, to further institutionalise and to integrate          
immigration, asylum and border management. We conclude by drawing attention to the            
potential role of the hotspot as an incubator for what we call liminal EU territory. Already,                
great swaths of the Greek territory are joining others - within and beyond the EU               
periphery - in becoming a sorting space that filters through the ‘deserving few’ and              
1 In using the term Mediterranean migration crisis we mean a political technology by which the 
construction of a migration event as a crisis in the Med has permitted the articulation of policies that 
would otherwise not have transpired in such a short space of time. This is not the first time migration is 
constructed as a crisis (see Jeandesboz & Wilkins 2014) that allows policy makers to treat it as an 
exceptional condition that seemingly forces them, in this way, to 'order' the 'disorder' at the border. 
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detains or removes the ‘undeserving’ and the ‘rightless’. Ever-greater segments of the            
population are in this way entangled into a negative, increasingly right-less relationship            
with the spaces they inhabit. What started as a highly flexible mechanism for governing              
diverse migrant populations is quickly generalised. Not only does it reinforce existing            
boundaries and distinctions, it now draws in and materialises new ones. Glimpsing            
through this opaque mechanism, looking through its veiling under its invocation to the             
urgent, we see a liminal EU territorial formation in which citizenship moves toward a              
more precarious model: where authority forcibly disentangles rights from territory. 
Hotspot genealogy - or, tracing the evolution of the politics of Institutionalisation            
of EU immigration and border policies 
 
Introduced in the European Agenda on Migration in May 2015, the hotspot was             
presented as an integrated approach to tackle the unruly movement on Europe’s borders             
and its knock-on effects on the EU. In this sense, the hotspot is - along with the newly                  
established European Border and Coast Guard and the Emergency Relocation scheme -            
the culmination of the Commission’s effort to Europeanise the border. Situated at            
so-called ‘frontline’ EU member states, the hotspot is a mechanism, effectively a            
decree-like order that allows the hosting of all relevant European agencies in order to              
bolster their cooperation and to centralise control over the external border. Once an area              
is declared a hotspot, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), Frontex, Europol            
and Eurojust come in to assist member-states to swiftly identify, register and fingerprint             
incoming migrants (European Commission, 2015). What is envisioned by the EC here is             
that the four agencies will support member-state authorities with registration,          
identification and removal of apprehended migrants (Frontex), the registration of asylum           
claims and preparation of relocation claimants (EASO) and the investigation and           
subsequent prosecution of crimes (Europol and Eurojust). Migration and asylum have           
been pivotal within the EU institutionalisation and governance process for some time            
now. Accordingly, the EU has spent years building a Common European Asylum System             
(CEAS), setting out minimum standards and procedures on issues related to the            
treatment of asylum seekers and those granted protection (known as the EU Asylum             
acquis), and has set up support funding mechanisms for the purpose of implementation             
and harmonisation as well as relevant jurisprudence. 
While the key referent for migration governance in Europe remains the state and             
associated state-centered logics of control, it has become long-evident that both the            
understanding of these issues and the pursuit of policy objectives are shaped by the EU               
(Cardwell, 2013). Yet at the same time policy implementation had up to this day              
remained a national responsibility, with member states expected to put it into effect. A              
policy crisis in asylum started forming from the early 1990's already, when spontaneous,             
if small scale, arrivals to Europe began and the individual status determination            
procedures proved expensive and ineffective since many, even if rejected, would stay on             
(Collinson, 1993). The introduction of the Dublin Convention in 1997 and its subsequent             
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replacement by Dublin Regulations II (2003) and III (2013), have been interpreted as the              
first step towards limiting the costs associated with asylum, by discouraging 'asylum            
shopping' in countries with strong reception systems. At the same time they have been              
also criticised as effectively privileging northern European countries, allowing them to           
send asylum seekers to the first 'safe' EU country they reach - thereby further controlling               
irregular mobility into their territories. This has essentially demarcated the Southern and            
South-eastern member states and their respective borders as territories of irregular entry            
and zones of gradual containment of unwanted migrant flows.  
As we argue in this paper, the hotspot approach in conjunction with the relocation              
mechanism operates as another, if even more effective, Dublin Regulation. By forcing            
individuals entering irregularly into the EU to request asylum at the frontline member             
states where they arrive, the hotspot hinders onward movement by means of            
institutionalising mobility. 
Expanding on the institutionalisation process, the introduction in 2004 of a           
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External           
Borders of the Member States of the EU, known as Frontex, launched a series of               
institutional and policy-making initiatives through an EU border management agenda          
and attached a definite security and military aspect to the integration process. The birth              
of Frontex went hand in hand with the emergence of a ‘global approach to migration’, a                
stated commitment to fight irregular migration and a reinforced management of Europe's            
Southern Maritime borders and maximisation of Frontex capacities (Carrera, 2007). Up           
to this date, Frontex relies on other member states for equipment and specialised             
personnel and receives its funds from the European Commission. From 2007 until 2015             
the EU has spent nearly two billion euros in efforts to secure its external borders through                
enhanced patrols by Frontex border guards and the introduction of SMART           
technologies, including the EURODAC system, a common database and rules for           
fingerprinting (Migreurop, 2012).  
Meanwhile, enhanced cooperation with third countries on returns saw a          
proliferation of EU-wide and bilateral readmission agreements that essentially created an           
expanded, transnational and multidimensional form of migration border governance. In          
this context, the off-shoring of the processing of asylum applications as well as             
immigration detention beyond the territorial limits of the European Union commonly           
referred to as the externalisation of asylum (Andrijasevic, 2010; Boswell, 2003;           
Triantafyllidou, 2010) and borders (Casas-Cortes et al., 2015), is widely considered           
among policy makers as an effective way to shut down asylum routes. In this way,               
attempts to control the mobility of certain populations deemed to be ‘irregular’, are             
pushed beyond the territorial limits of EU Member States, pointing at efforts to             
performatively secure the external dimension of European space (Vaughan-Williams,         
2015).  
Between them, the EU and member-state institutional policies and practices of           
deterrence in the name of security have resulted in the clandestinisation of migration             
(​Düvel, 2008) and a growing death toll in the Mediterranean Sea in particular: from              
January to July 21, 2016 alone, 2,977 people had died (IOM, 2016). Dubbed as              
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emergencies and exposing the porosity of the EU’s south-eastern border, they have            
given impetus to a decisive reconceptualisation of the mandate and role of Frontex as              
EU’s gatekeeper, with an emphasis on search and rescue (SAR) as well as Returns, and               
the institutionalisation of new players, such as the European Border and Coast Guard             
Agency. 
The summer and autumn of 2015 ushered us into a new era, but the groundwork               
for this had long been in the making. Already in the past, the seeming incapacity of                
certain member-states to contain or control the transit routes of incoming populations led             
them to the selective closure of borders. The Dublin regulation became effectively            
redundant for significant periods of time, and the future of the Common European             
Asylum System and of the Schengen Agreement as a whole were plunged into doubt. It               
was in this context, and in this way that the EC’s hotspot management approach and its                
Relocation schemes are being duly incorporated in the EU’s crisis toolbox: they become,             
in other words, part of the EU institutionalisation and integration process. 
European Integration 2.0. Towards flexi governing of mobility and asylum 
 
The institutional assemblage present at the border may seem overwhelming at first,            
however it is not powerful enough to seal the border.After all, the idea of a fenced                
continent from the straits of Gibraltar to the straits of Hellespont cannot be but a whisper,                
a sound clip from a time when emperors alone seemingly decided the fate of all. Tsianos                
and Karakayali (2010) were among the first to challenge the idea of a ‘Fortress Europe’               
on the grounds of a false perception regarding the non-impenetrability of borders. They             
advocate that a porous border is an image that reflects more accurately the continuous              
mobility in and through Europe, albeit not of this intensity. As borders have been              
historically produced within the context of nation-building processes and war, there has            
been a strong state centric view of them; a view that creates a sense of impenetrability                
and an ensuing awe in the face of them. The concept of Fortress Europe is a perfect                 
illustration of this: irrespectively of how many people successfully manage to challenge            
this deadly EU border regime every year, its image persists both in academia, the public               
discourse and activist circles. This is not to say that the EU border regime is not a deadly                  
machine of control. However, the constant invocation of the image of a fortress with              
wall-like borders, of borders that can be completely sealed off, depoliticises issues such             
as migration; it creates a sort of unchallenged paradigm for border control management             
and a need for constant technological innovation from the security and military industry;             
it obscures migrants agency and everyday struggles at the border; it debilitates the             
possibility of organising and resistance around the border by creating the image of             
absolute power of the state; finally, it creates the illusion of a very clear-cut distinction               
between inside and outside: a safe inside of deserving and equal citizens and a              
dangerous outside of undeserving people. 
Hence, along with transnational modes of governance and border and asylum           
externalisation, attempts to regulate mobility have manifested as a deterritorialised form           
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of sovereignty through the workings of European institutions, what Papadopoulos et al.            
refer to as ‘liminal porocratic institutions’ (2008). These liminal spaces play a crucial role              
in institutionalising mobility by contributing to a ‘decelerated circulation’, in which           
migration is not governed through space but through time (Papadopoulos et al., 2008, p.              
184). This liminal space can be understood as “a flexible regime of control which              
attempts to regulate mobility flows by forging contingent borderzones, wherever the           
routes of migration make the existing regime porous” (Papadopoulos et al., 2008, p. 74).              
Championing the academic current on the autonomy of migration, Papadopoulos et al            
understand liminality in a double sense: liminal as adaptable - as these institutions and              
spaces have to adapt to the EU regime of mobility control - and liminal in the sense that                  
they operate behind closed doors, beyond immediate and democratic control.  
Building further on this formulation, we can trace the liminality of the hotspot             
approach both in its design and in terms of its productive force. Seen in this way the                 
hotspot mechanism is more than the sum of the liminal porocratic institutions that make it               
and  the spaces in which it manifests. The essence of its liminality, spatial and              
institutional, is to be found in the transformation of the borderzone: in this case, large               
swaths of the entire Greek territory that turn into a pseudo-protection zone, whereby             
legal protection becomes a de facto tool for advancing the level of separation between              
citizens and non-citizens, ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’. This is accomplished by forcing           
migrants to seek international protection upon arrival, wherever the hotspot materialises           
as the only means of granting them access, albeit temporary and precarious, into EU              
territory. 
The hotspot is in this way a prime liminal space producer in the sense that liminal                
spaces and the practices that they use to institutionalise mobility also facilitate the             
immobility (Conlon, 2011) of transit populations. It is particularly important to see how the              
hotspot as the latest dispositif produces these liminal spaces. 
Within the various institutionalised logics of managing migration and mobility that           
long-characterised the function of European institutions within liminal spaces, the          
institutional integration of access to asylum and international protection within them is            
proving to be particularly effective. We believe this to be especially visible at registration              
and identification centers, spaces which are designated as ‘hotspots’ but also beyond            
those: in multiple sites across the Greek territory. In this way, and in addition to the initial                 
digital registration, identification checks and profiling based on nationality and potential           
strength of asylum claim, registration and decision on asylum applications also happens            
there. As such, the institutionalisation of mobility is strengthened by the well-established            
mechanisms humanitarian agency personnel use to govern the ‘undesirables’ in camps           
and transit points elsewhere in the world (Agier, 2010) and through EASO personnel             
deployed to check the authenticity of documents of those applying for asylum. When             
needed, and as allowed by the flexibility of the hotspot approach to population             
management, access to asylum and protection, it is used as a means to further              
decelerate mobility: for example, through the strategy of pre-registration of migrants           
arriving before the EU-Turkey deal had come to effect. These profiling activities take             
place within camps and transit reception facilities which have been likened to waiting and              
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processing zones (Agier 2010, 2011). They too constitute liminal spaces of           
institutionalising mobility through and beyond the islands of the Eastern Aegean. 
From the border-line to sorting-space 
 
The hotspot did not, then, appear out of the blue, as some kind of purely logistical                
response to the outbreak of the Mediterranean migration crisis. It traces its global routes              
in the intensification of the securitisation discourse in the Global North throughout the             
post-9/11 era. And it traces its specifically European routes in the advancement of the              
European integration project under way since the early 1990s. A project that has seen              
the intense disentanglement and re-entanglement of security, territory and         
super-national identity. 
In the case of the EU, central to the relationship between security and the              
Union’s immigration policies has been the problem of a construction of an EU identity              
and the political, legal and technological parameters that work to generate the process of              
EU integration and EU border formation. Ceyhan and Tsoukala (2002) point to the             
triptych of fear of loss of sovereignty, fear of crime and of weakening border controls               
upon which the demonisation of migration relies, as a constitutional component in the             
process of EU integration. Security policy has been introduced to mean a “specific policy              
of mediating belonging” (Huysmans, 2000) and defining ‘desirable’ and ‘undesirable’          
subjects (Ceylan & Tsoukala, 2002, Van Houtum et al., 2015). Again for Huysmans, this              
process needs to be understood within the coordinates of the European political project:             
one of the EU single market project by-products was the largely unchallenged logic that,              
if we diminish internal border controls, we must replace the net loss of security by               
fortifying external borders (Huysmans, 2000). The successful securitisation of the          
external EU border then lies in inventing and managing an internal security issue. The              
1997 Treaty of Amsterdam and the subsequent incorporation of the Schengen           
Agreement is a manifestation of this logic, while two major enlargement waves and the              
Eurozone financial and political crisis certainly exacerbated feelings of insecurity. What           
our research shows is that the political construction of the 2015 migration event as a               
crisis -owing to a significant increase in the number of arrivals interpreted as a failure in                
securing borders and managing migrations, also falls within the remit of this exact             
rationale. 
Within and beyond the EU paradigm it is particularly interesting to see how such              
re-bordering practices come into direct tension with the forces of globalisation. Due to             
the expansion and consolidation of economic globalisation and neoliberalism, a large           
segment of the world’s territory has been undergoing an apparent de-bordering process:            
as border controls are lifted, borderlines appear to be softer and less relevant, and              
sovereignty appears to be diffusing away from the nation-state, weakening the link            
between political identities, citizenship, participation and the territorial state (Ohmae,          
1995; Soysal, 1994). The ostensibly decreasing importance of the nation-state means           
that state borders become less relevant under the weight of the need for the free flow of                 
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capital, labour, ideas and so on. Drawing on Deleuze and Guatttari (1972), this has been               
termed de-territorialisation (Dittgen, 2000; Kolossov and O’Loughlin, 1998; Newman,         
2006; Ohmae, 1990; Shapiro and Alker, 1996). 
But things are not moving in one direction - far from so. On the one hand, there is                  
this pressure for a globalised borderless world, where capital and goods can flow             
uninhibited. On the other hand, the rise of the securitisation discourse and the increasing              
construction of issues as security related threats (Buzan et al., 1998) is pulling towards              
the exact opposite direction. Within this context of constant struggle between the two             
discourses and practices, some borders are opening up or becoming softer           
(de-territorialisation), while others are closing or becoming harder (re-territorialisation).         
But most importantly, this tension between economic globalisation and security concerns           
tends to create uneven and tenuous border regimes (Ackleston, 2011) in order to govern              
mobility. The resulting regimes provide an excess mobility or hyper-mobility for some,            
while immobilising others, the ‘exceptions’: migrants, refugees and other identity-based          
groups (Hannam et al., 2006).   
The European Union project may very well be the world’s foremost example of             
such an uneven and tenuous border regime: since the early 1990s, the gradual lifting of               
internal borders and of other restrictions on the right to move of EEA (European              
Economic Area) citizens, as dictated by the advancement of the European project, led to              
an increased sense of lack of control over the external EU border. As a result, and                
exacerbated by the increasing construction of issues as security related threats           
(securitisation), public and transit spaces with European territory gradually and          
potentially became strategic places for border control enforcement (Amoore et al., 2008;            
Bigo, 2001; Coleman, 2007; Euskirchen et al., 2007). In other words, preying upon the              
constant fear of terrorism as well as the construction of migration as an invasion, this               
internal deficit discourse (Bigo, 2001) essentially redeploys control from the external           
border to the EU territory interior: in police operations such as Greece’s Xenios Zeus              
(Filippidis, 2013) or Sweden’s REVA project, migrant-looking individuals are targeted,          
stopped and searched by the police in public spaces, while employers and universities             
gradually become liable for checking the immigration status of their employees and            
students respectively. 
EU’s strive for further integration through the europeanisation of border control           
and the institutionalisation of mobility should not necessarily be viewed as antagonistic            
to the rise of nationalist agendas in individual member-states. Certainly events such as             
the Brexit and the rise of extreme right wing political parties in continental Europe can be                
considered as a backlash to EU’s political management of the 2008 financial crisis and              
the sustained austerity in the continent. This has prompted many to proclaim the             
downfall of the EU. However, as we suggest, it might be too soon to be able to discern                  
whether the EU project is actually withering away or if it is simply in a process of                 
reconfiguration, a process that may very well be going hand in hand with such              
isolationist processes within member-states. In this context, the hotspot approach, at the            
same time reifying and removing the migrant threat, feeds into the nationalist anxieties             
as much as it reinforces an integration of a selected kind, targeting for instance security               
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and financial aspects of the Union.  
In coming together, the EU therefore led the path in the crucial breaking of the               
link between territory and rights. In bitter irony, a project built on the idea of freedom of                 
movement within the integrated EU space signalled the erosion of rights for all, via those               
seeking rights by moving toward and through its territory. Through its integration project,             
the EU has not only denied newcomers entry but has signalled a potential rupture of               
historic proportions in the way rights and territory have been entangled throughout the             
Westphalian order: at the essence of the contemporary nation-state lies the premise that             
it has the power to exclude and the power to include people at its border. Yet the hotspot                  
constitutes the culmination of a process wherein, under the pretext of security of the              
common European area, and in order to guarantee the freedom of movement of EEA              
citizens, the border-like evaluation of who is to be included or excluded is redrawn;              
departing from the border it follows those traversing inward the EU, and it now              
incorporates entire territorial segments of exemplary post-Westphalian western states:         
the EU’s so-called front line states. 
In the current political juncture, there is a historical parallel that cannot be             
ignored: as the nation-state was formed and consolidated on the basis of multiple layers              
of exclusions, citizenship became the state’s attempt to identify who belongs, a reading             
technology to make a society legible (Scott, 1998), an instrument of social enclosure             
(Brubaker, 1999). The refugee, the displaced person and the asylum seeker are            
products of the nation-states as these strive to administer sovereignty (Sassen, 1999). In             
this way, the invention of identity documents -and most notably the passport- has been              
the state’s attempt to institutionalise mobility (Torpey, 2000). In the past, identification            
was based on external identifiable characteristics of race and the right to move was              
limited to those who possessed wealth. However, with modern citizenship establishing           
who belongs has necessarily taken the institutional form of a passport (Jones, 2016). In              
this way, border management becomes the ​par excellence exercise of state sovereignty            
and the migrant the citizen’s other: the ever-walled states (Brown, 2010) despite and             
against the waning sovereignty of the state. Today, in ways resembling the rise of the               
modern state, it is the EU super-state that becomes the vector of the further              
institutionalisation of mobility. 
Our research on the hotspot points at a construction much exceeding the mere             
management of populations at the gates of the EU territory. We now believe this to be a                 
territorial incubator, a testing site for the formation of what we term liminal EU territory.               
We mean this to be liminal in two ways: first, it is of course liminal in that these parts of                    
territory are still adjacent to the border; they are the threshold separating the outside              
from the inside. But there is a second signalling of this liminality. Thanks to the               
invocation of an emergency, the hotspot becomes a space of exception in terms of the               
decree-like overrunning of national authorities by their European superiors, as we saw in             
the previous section. A particular form of graduated sovereignty, adaptable, flexible and            
conditioned upon time as much as space. It would be tempting to talk of the hotspot as a                  
direct product of enclavisation, the EU-dictated formation of a specific territorial enclave            
within the territories of nation state. But enclavisation denotes a double fortification, a             
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border-inside-the-border and further, it implies de-mobilisation. In the case of the           
hotspot, on the other hand, time (the limited condition of the emergency) produces space              
(the exceptional territory) which in turn creates movement: entirely disjointed from any            
territory-inducing rights, the populations going through the hotspot aspire only to keep            
moving away. Movement becomes their ultimate goal and in some deep irony, also the              
ultimate condition of their control. A new form of citizenship is arising within the              
integrated EU territory, even if ‘citizenship’ may be an over-statement for what is now a               
constantly conditional relationship between the authorities and their newly conditioned          
subjects. In outlining the complicated relationship between urban space and citizenship,           
Alsayyad and Roy (2006) have shown how our relationship to urban space as urban              
citizens is dictated by paradigmatic sites forming new citizenship prototypes in return. It             
is possible to argue that the hotspot is the paradigmatic space where new forms of               
super-national citizenship prototypes are tried out in return: spaces where territory and            
rights are disentangled in the process of the formation of global assemblages (Sassen,             
2006) and reconstituted in an ever-temporary, ever-liminal fashion. 
 
Creating liminal EU territory 
 
While we were conducting our research (early summer 2016) the large-scale informal            
camp at the Greek-Macedonian border was evicted by the police, its residents scattered             
across thirty transit points across the Greek territory, particularly across the country’s            
North. ​The camp emerged as part of the Western Balkan route, as activists from the               
Balkans and from all over Europe gathered to offer assistance to transiting migrants             
waiting to cross the border. It was violently dismantled by the Greek police on May 24,                
2016, in an operation which, completely hidden from the media, took place after the              
removal of all activists and NGO workers, over a period of several days and involved the                
(involuntary) movement of thousands of people (estimates put the number of people            
stranded in Idomeni at 8,400). These were then dispersed among their thirty newly and              
hastily built refugee camps around the country, especially around Thessaloniki. In this            
sense, the whole region is becoming a new waiting zone for people wanting to reach the                
EU, part of the same time and space regime (Andersson, 2014) that creates             
transnational spaces of control (Shamir, 2005) or transit spaces, fluid and constantly            
reconfigured (Collyer, 2007). 
The varied institutional status and multiple forms of governance ruling these           
centres point at chaos, albeit an organised one at that: an attempt at creating what we                
think is a controllably fluid condition, an ever-shifting, ever-moving management of these            
territories and of course their populations. A form of territorial precarity that naturally             
destitutes the populations subjected to it from any long-term attachment and any            
ensuing claim to belonging, to possession of right to stay put, let alone of course any                
right to permanent residence or citizenship. In this way, the repression and the eviction              
of the informal camps in Idomeni and elsewhere were not, as advertised, an attempt to               
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clamp down on the informality and precarity that accompanied these. They were a first              
step in an attempt that has seen identical state-sponsored spaces mushroom across the             
Greek territory: identical not only in squalor, in terms of their living conditions, but also in                
terms of their temporary character and the ensuing forced detachment between territory            
and population: the latter are no longer citizens, dwellers or bearers of any other              
residence-induced rights. They are the traversing populations, there only in order to soon             
be elsewhere. 
In the advent of the hotspot approach, institutional arrangements put a greater            
emphasis on registration and identification. Following the beginning of the          
implementation of the EU-Turkey deal, registration sites have become detention          
facilities. In a sense, the attention to registration and documentation in this integrated             
model of protection and control implies that the hotspot model functions first and             
foremost as a captivity device. Operating agencies extract information and share           
intelligence behind closed doors. While at capture, the process of sorting begins by way              
of admission or not into the asylum system, and in extension onto the Dublin system and                
relocation mechanism, while the. The remaining lot go through fast track inadmissibility            
procedures for the purpose of assessing whether they could be returned to Turkey or              
not. While inadmissible cases can be challenged before the appeals committees, access            
to legal aid is inhibited. More than that, it is restricted by force. Allegations against EASO                
staff working at the hotspot on Lesbos employing private security guards to fend off legal               
practitioners came only a few weeks prior to the disturbing development with regards to              
the recent amendment of the appeals committee and their replacement with new ones             
consisting of two magistrates and a member indicated by the UNHCR, allegedly            
portraying a higher degree of impartiality and independence. The enhancement of the            
judicial character of the committees undermines the Greek constitution and it is highly             
questionable for its suitability to provide a balanced decision since, according to the             
Greek judicial culture, it is rare that a decision made by a Magistrate is questioned by                
another Magistrate. Furthermore, Magistrates in the new Appeals Committee serve a           
three year term and can only be replaced by order of the Ministry of Interior. All together,                 
recent amendment to legislation with regard to the organisation and operation of the             
Asylum Service, Appeals Authority and Reception and Identification Service, point to a            
violation of the democratic principle of the separation of powers - since the separation of               
judiciary and executive power is compromised. 
More than that, it is a clear indication of how the model of integrated              
management extends well beyond the islands where hotspots are located and           
penetrates through to the constitutional pillars of the state apparatus. The condition of             
invisibility in which the sorting of migrant bodies occurs is an essential element for the               
success of the operation. 
The Greek-Macedonian border closure has had a transformative effect.  Ever          
since, for most of those ‘trapped’ in Greece and arrived prior to March 18 and thus fall                 
out the scope of the EU-Turkey deal, entrance into the country’s asylum system has              
become the only gateway into receiving protection in Europe. To this point, a large scale               
operation was launched in early June to pre-register all those residing within ‘reception             
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facilities’ around the country. Funded by the EC, its implementation is led by the Greek               
Asylum Service and relies on joint teams drawing personnel and expertise from the             
UNHCR, EASO and International Organisation for Migration (IOM). The target is to            
incorporate into this scheme all those who arrived in Greece between January and             
March 20. Its purpose is to register the intention for an asylum application of individuals               
in order (1) to eventually register an official request for international protection in Greece;              
(2) to be eligible for transfer under Dublin III; and (3) to be eligible for relocation, after                 
registering an official asylum claim. According to independent legal practitioners          
monitoring pre-registration reception facilities in mainland Greece, the pre-registration         
process is operationalised with the use of ambiguous tools, such as information leaflets             
which misguide migrants into thinking they have made an asylum application. Once            
pre-registered, the date to register an actual asylum claim may be yet many months              
ahead. During this time, their legal status in the country remains uncertain, with the              
promise of a yet to be fulfilled ‘right’ to request international protection. The             
pre-registration process offers hope but no guarantees, it is liminal by definition, it lies on               
a threshold of a promised but false protection (pseudo-protection) and further           
criminalisation, as the latter becomes imminent should they decide to ‘escape’ the Greek             
territory. While this is evidently a desperate attempt to enforce the Dublin Regulation and              
rescue what little faith still remains in the Relocation Processes, pre-registration is one             
more indication of the EU’s extensive capacity to manage mobility through means of             
institutionalisation and the formation of  ambiguous categories.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Throughout this paper we have presented an overview of the hotspot mechanism. In             
terms of a historical genealogy, we suggest that the arrival of the hotspot may be read as                 
one moment along the timeline of Europe’s institutionalisation process, in which the EU             
undergoes a process of becoming through expanding its government structures. Viewed           
under this light, a hotspot, both as a management approach and as a new spatial               
contract agreed between Brussels and its member-states, is a bold step, albeit            
experimental, towards a governing model that values flexibility and efficiency and           
bypasses traditional forms of institutional accountability. What gives life and form to the             
EU hotspot, we have argued here, is the way in which it is intertwined with pre-existing                
mechanisms of bordering and control. For this exact reason it is necessary to conceive              
the hotspot as more of an antisoma to the vulnerable body of the European border               
regime instead, through the multiple forms in which the approach may take shape and              
form beyond the border itself, it can engineer a host of different assemblages between              
actors and institutions that allow for the government of populations. This is evident in the               
way in which it connects and reinforces other nodes of governance and control. By virtue               
of declaring an area of an EU member-state into a hotspot, as in the case of Greece, a                  
host of different possibilities have materialised, ranging from the formation of territorial            
enclaves which restrict rights and mobility to the strengthening of registration and            
identification of populations facilitated by an assemblage of state, EU and humanitarian            
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actors. In this way, the hotspot approach is already radically transforming certain key             
government operations and functions playing out in the Greek territory as a whole. We              
have shown what the implementation of the hotspot approach potentially means for the             
position of certain territories within the emergent EU ‘super-state’. And further: we            
opened up the question of what this might mean for the swift untangling and              
re-entangling between territory, citizenship and rights. 
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